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INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, the United States has often strug-
gled to maintain the delicate balance between liberty and se-
curity—a task as difficult as it is exceptionally important.1  The
† B.A. International Studies, Boston College, 2013; Candidate for J.D. Cor-
nell Law School, 2016; Senior Online Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 101.
Thanks first to my parents, Brian and Patrice, for their many years of love and
support. I am also grateful to the Cornell University Library staff, who were im-
mensely helpful to me throughout this project. Finally, I thank my fellow members
of the Cornell Law Review for their editorial contributions to this Note.
1 Examples include the Alien and Sedition Acts and the internment of Japa-
nese citizens during World War II. See generally Philip Hamburger, Beyond Pro-
tection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1894–96 (2009) (noting that the Alien and
Sedition Acts “left broad discretion in the executive to adopt regulations against [ ]
aliens” and “did not require the executive to use any judicial process in its ordi-
nary enforcement of [such] regulations”); id. at 1929–30 (noting that Japanese
1087
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D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Ralls Corp. v. Committee on For-
eign Investment2 exemplifies this problem.  The decision as-
serts that courts have jurisdiction to review the process by
which the President investigates and prohibits foreign invest-
ment transactions that threaten national security.3  This issue
has serious implications not only for legal theory but also for
national security and America’s role in the globalized interna-
tional community.
Where globalization is a defining trait of the modern era,
foreign direct investment (FDI) is its lifeblood.4  For decades,
the United States has vocally advocated for increased FDI,5
which efficiently allocates knowledge and capital across bor-
ders.6  As the top investor and recipient of such investment, the
United States takes in hundreds of billions of dollars annually
from foreign sources, and American entities invest abroad at
the same rate;7 however, these economic gains are not without
risk.  FDI creates notable security issues, necessitating policies
that balance economic interest with precautionary measures.8
internment lacked “either direct legislative authorization or even a legislative sus-
pension of habeas for its treatment of the American citizens”).  Practices regarding
detainees in the War on Terror are a more current example of this balancing
problem, for which a resolution is not immediately discernable.
2 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
3 Id. at 307–09.
4 See Andrew Burke et al., The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on New
Firm Survival in the UK, 31 SMALL BUS. ECON. 395, 395 (2008) (noting that FDI is
“likely . . . the most important aspect of globalisation in economic terms”); Press
Release, World Trade Org., Foreign Direct Inv. Seen as Primary Motor of Globaliza-
tion, Says WTO Dir.-Gen. (Feb. 13, 1996), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
pres96_e/pr042_e.htm [http://perma.cc/P6FB-45EX].
5 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2013).
6 Press Release, World Trade Org., supra note 4 (arguing that FDI promotes R
the “creation of wealth . . . [and] can release much of the untapped production
potential of today’s developing and transition economies, while at the same time
opening up new markets”). See also EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 57–59 (3d ed. 1995) (recognizing
three primary sources of economic gain: “comparative advantage” through trade-
enabled specialization, “increasing returns to scale,” and “increased competi-
tion”).  Graham and Krugman also note the potential for domestic economic costs
to FDI, such as negative effects on the labor market and threats to national
sovereignty. Id. at 59–60.  These potential costs are unrelated to national secur-
ity, and some would construe certain actions to prevent them as protectionism,
which United States FDI policy arguably does not support. See infra note 75 and R
accompanying text.
7 See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1–2. R
8 See id. at 7 (noting that “[s]ome observers [ ] view some of these investments
as posing potential threats”). See generally GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 6, at R
95–120 (detailing threats to national security emanating from FDI); infra note 27 R
and accompanying text (arguing that FDI has been perceived as a threat to na-
tional security since at least World War I).
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Consequently, although the United States “treat[s] foreign in-
vestors no less favorably” than American ones in most in-
stances, there are certain national security exceptions to this
general rule.9
One such exception is the power held by the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which “serves
the President in overseeing the national security implications of
foreign investment.”10  The CFIUS committee,11 which derives
its authority from legislative and executive sources,12 reviews
foreign acquisitions, mergers, and other transactions for na-
tional security threats.13  These threats encompass “a broad
range of national security considerations” pertaining to foreign
control of American businesses.14  After an initial thirty-day
review, the committee may initiate a subsequent forty-five-day
investigation.15  Alternatively, if the committee determines that
the transaction does not constitute a threat to national secur-
ity, it informs the parties and the transaction goes through.16
If CFIUS chooses the subsequent investigation and “finds that
a covered transaction presents national security risks” that
other provisions of law do not adequately protect against, it can
take steps to reduce such risks or forward the case for presi-
dential action, including prohibition of a given transaction or
mandatory divestment.17
The CFIUS process pits security considerations and prop-
erty rights against each other in a struggle between concepts
9 JACKSON, supra note 5. R
10 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22863, FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
CFIUS, AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2011).
11 This Note refers to “The CFIUS committee” when specifically denoting the
committee in order to distinguish between that and the CFIUS process generally,
which includes presidential involvement.
12 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012); Exec. Order No. 11,858, as amended, 31
C.F.R. 800.
13 Dep’t of the Treasury, Process Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 1,
2010, 8:08 AM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign
-investment/Pages/cfius-overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/W8TN-WCQS].
14 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR CY 2012
22 (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-in
vestment/Documents/2013%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20PUBLIC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SM83-C25C].  For an overview of how CFIUS considers certain
factors, see generally Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Con-
ducted by the Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567,
74,568–72 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Guidance] (providing examples of covered
transactions and identifying statutorily defined and other factors pertinent to
CFIUS review).
15 Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 13. R
16 Id.
17 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN405.txt unknown Seq: 4  4-MAY-16 13:29
1090 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1087
that were both fundamentally important at the nation’s found-
ing.  Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion prominently suggest the importance of national defense.18
Likewise, John Jay noted in The Federalist No. 3 that, “[a]mong
the many objects to which a wise and free people find it neces-
sary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety
seems to be the first.”19  Alexander Hamilton also addressed
serious national security concerns for the fledgling union in
The Federalist No. 8, though he admittedly expressed concerns
about security interests trampling liberty.20
The principles underlying property rights were perhaps
even more important to the founders.21  John Adams stated,
“The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is
not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of
law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny com-
mence.”22  Likewise, although some scholars contend that the
Declaration of Independence’s substitution of the phrase “pur-
suit of happiness” for “property” suggests a lesser appreciation
for the property right, others more persuasively argue that the
writers equated that pursuit with “the free acquisition, posses-
sion and use of property.”23  Furthermore, the early revolu-
18 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S. 1776) (noting the
“Power to levy War [and] conclude Peace” first in a list of the powers of “Free and
Independent States”); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (endeavoring to “provide for the common
defence”).
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 18 (John Jay) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed.,
2008).  Notably, Hamilton believed that a standing army and internal disunion
constituted the greatest national security threats, and he feared that a focus on
“[s]afety from external danger” would overpower “[e]ven the ardent love of liberty.”
Id.  In this and other writings, Hamilton essentially describes the need for balance
between liberty and security that this Note identifies.
21 See GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 30–34, 59–63 (1995) (noting
the importance of property rights in the Declaration of Independence, the Consti-
tution, and early state constitutions); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 6
(1990) (stating that the framers viewed property as “a right whose security was
essential to the economic and political success of the new republic” and that “[i]f
property could not be protected, not only prosperity, but liberty, justice, and the
international strength of the nation would ultimately be destroyed”).
22 DIETZE, supra note 21, at 34.  It is notable that Adams expresses a connec- R
tion between property rights and security by noting that insubstantial support for
the former would lead to “anarchy.”  Dietze suggests that Adams’ opinion “was
shared by many.” Id.
23 Id. at 31, 59 (arguing that “[i]f Jefferson had wanted to omit an emphasis
on property, then he would have refrained from denouncing the king’s infringe-
ments upon the colonists’ property so emphatically.”); see Edward J. Erler, The
Great Fence to Liberty: The Right to Property in the American Founding, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, & THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 43, 50–52 (Ellen Fran-
kel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
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tion’s rallying cry of “no taxation without representation”
underscores the focus on property issues.24
This application of eighteenth-century thinking on liberty
(expressed through property rights) and security calls for rec-
ognition that the United States now faces different threats.  The
growing danger of radicalized non-state actors,25 the global
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,26 and the intense
speed and power of modern warfare are just some examples,
each requiring strong policy responses.  FDI also presents
modern threats that were largely unimaginable to the foun-
ders.27  Theodore Moran identifies three threat categories that
originate in FDI—foreign acquisitions of American entities
“that would make the United States dependent on a foreign-
controlled supplier of crucial goods or services,” “that would
allow transfer of technology or expertise to a [harmful] foreign-
controlled entity (or its government),” or “that could allow in-
sertion of the means for infiltration, surveillance, or sabotage
. . . in goods or services crucial to the functioning of the US
economy.”28  The threat of espionage is particularly troubling,
because the United States is a global technology leader and an
important military and diplomatic power.29
24 DIETZE, supra note 21, at 30. R
25 See DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26: COUNTER-
TERRORISM, I1–I2 (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp3_26.pdf [https://perma.cc/B43M-YWU7] (“[T]he rise in sectarian and ethnic
conflict has increased hostilities within countries and terrorism is becoming com-
monplace.  Information and communications technology and other advanced
technologies . . . are used by a wide range of state and non-state actors.  As a
result, the strategic security environment has become more complex and more
menacing as nation states and non-state actors compete for strategic influence
and access.”).
26 C.f. Desmond Butler & Vadim Ghirda, AP Investigation: Nuclear Black Mar-
ket Seeks IS Extremists (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:pub
licid:ap.org:6fd1d202f40c4bb4939bd99c3f80ac2b [https://perma.cc/F46Q-
DE3J] (noting, for example, the international market for former Soviet nuclear
materials).
27 Although modern technology, particularly that which facilitates espionage,
makes FDI a greater threat today than in the past, it is noteworthy that “FDI has
played a significant role in the development of the US economy since at least the
1870s” and has been recognized as a threat since at least World War I. EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, US NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT 2–3 (2006).
28 THEODORE H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
CFIUS PROCESS 1 (2009).
29 See Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security
Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of
Globalization, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 200 (2012) (“[V]ulnerability to espio-
nage—military or economic—is hardly a secret. . . . Those operating on the
frontlines of American counter-intelligence efforts echo the sentiment: ‘The Cold
War is not over, it has merely moved into a new arena: the global marketplace.’”).
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This Note considers these problems and analyzes whether
the Ralls decision adequately addresses the balance between
liberty and security.  Part I provides a detailed background of
the Ralls case and a history of the CFIUS process, noting with
particular attention the legislative and executive intent in es-
tablishing its authority.  Part II discusses various problems
with the Ralls decision from both a legal and practical perspec-
tive.  First, it argues that the decision misconstrues the limits
of a statutory bar on judicial review of the President’s actions.
Second, it discusses why the D.C. Circuit Court should not
have ruled on the merits of the case, arguing that it presents a
nonjusticiable matter reserved for the political branches of gov-
ernment.  Third, it demonstrates that the decision will produce
a counterproductive result.  Fourth, it argues that the decision
encourages resolution on executive privilege grounds and dis-
cusses the negative implications of this conclusion.  In Part III,
this Note addresses how the government could maintain an
appropriate balance between liberty and security in CFIUS
matters.  Finally, it concludes by considering whether Ralls will
have any lasting impact on the CFIUS process and expounding
the responsibility of Congress and the President in this area of
the law.
I
THE HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF RALLS AND CFIUS REVIEW
A. RALLS:  BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND RESULT
In March 2012, Ralls Corp., an affiliate of the Chinese con-
struction and machinery conglomerate Sany Group,30 pur-
chased four American companies that were developing wind
farms in Oregon.31  At the time of purchase, these companies
had already acquired certain easements and contracts neces-
sary to conduct their business.32  The wind farm properties
were “in and around the eastern region of a restricted airspace
and bombing zone maintained by the United States Navy,”33
30 See Press Release, Sany Group, Suing President Obama Sany Fights for
Dignity (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.sanygroup.com/group/en-us/media/
34262_for_news_text.htm [http://perma.cc/9EHZ-AHW6].  For a discussion of
possible national security threats from Chinese FDI policy in particular, see gen-
erally Saha, supra note 29, at 201–08 (arguing that Chinese FDI in the U.S. R
“creates a potential conduit for leaking American technology, intellectual prop-
erty, and sensitive information pertaining to critical infrastructure”) and GRAHAM
& MARCHICK, supra note 27, at 101–04 (asserting similar arguments). R
31 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
32 Id. at 304.
33 Id.
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but notably, “other foreign-owned wind turbines near the re-
stricted airspace” were unchallenged.34  Though Ralls Corp.
knew that its acquisitions might be subject to a CFIUS investi-
gation, it chose not to seek a preliminary ruling from the com-
mittee before acquiring the companies and properties at
issue.35
Soon after, the CFIUS committee concluded that the Ralls
Corp. transactions threatened national security and it ordered
mitigation measures on July 25, 2012.36  The order required
Ralls Corp. to cease construction and operations at certain
project sites, remove all stored items at those sites within five
days, and refrain from accessing those locations.37  On July 30,
the CFIUS committee initiated an additional investigation,
which led to issuance of an amended order on August 2.38  On
September 13, the committee concluded its investigation and
forwarded a report to the President for his decision.39  The
President, in a timely order, then directed Ralls Corp. to
(1) divest itself of all interests in the Project Companies, their
assets and their operations within ninety days of the Order,
(2) remove all items from the project sites . . . , (3) cease
access to the project sites, (4) refrain from selling, transfer-
ring or facilitating the sale or transfer of “any items made or
otherwise produced by the Sany Group to any third party for
use or installation at the [project sites]” and (5) adhere to
restrictions on the sale of the Project Companies and their
assets to third parties.40
34 Id. at 304–05.  It is also notable that the government uses the airspace in
question for flying drones—an area of technological competition between the
United States and China.  Nin-Hai Tseng, Sany’s Bold U.S. Move, FORTUNE, June
17, 2013, http://fortune.com/2013/06/17/sanys-bold-u-s-move [http://perma.
cc/E835-384W]. See William Wan & Peter Finn, Global Race on to Match U.S.
Drone Capabilities, WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/global-race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/
06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html [http://perma.cc/X3A8-6P6Y] (describing the
competition for drone development between China and the United States).
35 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 307.  Foreign entities are increasingly seeking voluntary
CFIUS review before closing similar acquisitions. See generally Alexandra Lo´pez-
Casero, A Year in Review: More Transactions Run into CFIUS Trouble, NIXON
PEABODY LLP: NOW + NEXT (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/
167021_M_and_A_16JAN2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/G79W-PT6E] (noting that
“an increasing number of M&A lawyers and deal parties recognize the benefit of
filing a voluntary notice and involving CFIUS early on in the process in order to
obtain CFIUS clearance”).
36 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 305.
37 Id.
38 See id. (detailing the amended order, which placed limitations on Ralls
Corp.’s ability to sell the companies or their assets).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 306 (alteration in original).
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The Presidential Order also revoked the CFIUS Orders pertain-
ing to Ralls Corp.41  As a result, that Presidential Order was the
only remaining source of executive authority in effect.
Ralls Corp. filed suit against the CFIUS committee, its
chairman, and the President in the D.C. District Court, seeking
invalidation of both the CFIUS and Presidential Orders.42  The
company alleged that the CFIUS order was invalid under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), that “the actions of [the
committee and the President] . . . [were] ultra vires,” and that
both of the orders were unconstitutional under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.43  The court held that the Defense
Production Act (DPA)—the enabling statute for CFIUS author-
ity—“barred judicial review of Ralls’s ultra vires and equal pro-
tection challenges to the Presidential Order but not Ralls’s due
process challenge thereto.”44  It also held that remaining claims
about the CFIUS order “were mooted by the Presidential Or-
der.”45  The court then ruled in favor of the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss the due process claims, holding that the Order
“did not deprive Ralls of a constitutionally protected property
interest . . . because Ralls ‘voluntarily acquired those state
property rights subject to the known risk of a Presidential veto’
and ‘waived the opportunity . . . to obtain a determination . . .
before it entered into the transaction.’”46  The court finally
noted that, “even if Ralls had a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest, the [Government] provided Ralls with due process
. . . [by] inform[ing] Ralls in June 2012 that the transaction had
to be reviewed and g[iving] Ralls the opportunity to submit
evidence in its favor.”47
41 Id.
42 See id.  Ralls Corp. originally filed suit against the CFIUS committee and its
chairman but amended the complaint, adding the President as a defendant, fol-
lowing the issuance of the Presidential Order of September 28.
43 Id. This Note does not delve into the intricacies of the APA, focusing in-
stead—like the Circuit Court’s opinion—on review of the President’s actions
rather than those of the CFIUS committee. See infra note 89 (noting that the R
President is not an agency and is therefore not subject to the APA).  It suffices to
say that the APA allows courts to review and overturn decisions that an adminis-
trative agency made in an “arbitrary [and] capricious” manner.  5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2012).  For further discussion, see Jacob A. Stein et al., 6-51 ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 51.03 (2014) (explaining the “arbitrary and capricious test”).
44 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 306.
45 Id. at 306–07.  For this reason, the court granted 12(b)(1) dismissal of the
relevant counts. See id.
46 Id. at 307 (second omission in original) (quoting Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on
Foreign Inv., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 27 (D.D.C. 2013)).
47 Id.
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Ralls Corp. then appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court, chal-
lenging the dismissal of its due process claims against the
Presidential Order and its claims against the CFIUS Order.  The
court held that, although the DPA states that “[t]he actions
[and findings] of the President . . . [regarding CFIUS determina-
tions] shall not be subject to judicial review,”48 there was no
“clear and convincing” evidence of Congressional intent to bar
review of constitutional claims.49  The court supported this
finding by claiming that “[t]he text [of the statute] does not [ ]
refer to the reviewability of a constitutional claim challenging
the process preceding . . . presidential action.”50  The court also
held that the government had deprived Ralls Corp. of a pro-
tected property interest and that the corporation had not
waived that interest “by failing to seek pre-approval” of its ac-
quisitions.51  This deprivation, the court claimed, lacked the
requisite due process because the government did not “provide
notice of, and access to, the unclassified information used to
prohibit the transaction,” and because Ralls Corp. needed that
information for a legitimate opportunity to respond to the
CFIUS committee and the President.52  As a result, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the district
court “with instructions that Ralls be provided . . . access to the
unclassified evidence on which the President relied and an op-
portunity to respond thereto.”53
On November 6, 2014, the D.C. District Court issued an
order in accordance with the appellate court’s decision.54  The
order required the executive to provide Ralls Corp. “with access
to all unclassified material contained in the record compiled by
CFIUS and all unclassified factual findings or evidence under-
lying CFIUS’s recommendation to the President.”55  The order
also established a framework within which the President could
make an executive privilege claim and Ralls Corp. could in turn
challenge it.56  Additionally, it provided Ralls Corp. a later “op-
portunity to respond to and/or rebut the information in writ-
48 Id. at 307–08 (first alteration in original).
49 Id. at 308–11.
50 Id. at 311.
51 Id. at 315–17.
52 See id. at 317–20.
53 Id. at 325.  The court also remanded claims regarding the CFIUS Order
without addressing the merits, because the district court had previously dis-
missed them on jurisdictional grounds. See id.
54 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., Nos. 12-1513, 12-2026 (ABJ), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177868 (D.D.C. 2014).
55 Id. at *5.
56 See id. at *5–6.
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ing.”57  Notably, it also required the CFIUS committee to
consider that response and issue another recommendation to
the President, who would then have to make a final determina-
tion regarding the transactions in question.58  The President
ultimately chose to release almost all of the unclassified docu-
ments—consisting of over 3,487 pages—withholding only two
unclassified documents with an executive privilege claim.59
Despite this significant step toward resolving the case, the
D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Ralls is problematic.  It devi-
ates from the judiciary’s traditional deference to the executive
in matters of foreign affairs and national security,60 setting a
dangerous precedent for judicial intrusion into these important
areas.
B. The History of CFIUS
CFIUS originated in an Executive Order that President
Ford issued in 1975.61  In its original form, the committee
“lacked its present authority to prevent or suspend foreign in-
vestment transactions,” but instead played a monitoring role
and “coordinate[d] the implementation of United States policy
regarding foreign investment.”62  Economic concerns led Con-
57 Id. at *6.
58 See id.
59 See Karlee Weinmann, In Rare Move, CFIUS Hands Over Cache of Ralls
Docs, LAW360 (2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/599760/in-rare-move-
cfius-hands-over-cache-of-ralls-docs [https://perma.cc/XQ8G-R9W6]; see also
TIMOTHY KEELER ET AL., MAYER BROWN, US GOVERNMENT PRODUCES UNCLASSIFIED DOC-
UMENTS IN LITIGATION REGARDING CFIUS REVIEW OF CHINESE INVESTMENT, http://
www.mayerbrown.com/US-Government-Produces-Unclassified-Documents-in-
Litigation-Regarding-CFIUS-Review-of-Chinese-Investment-12-05-2014/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2QC8-PLPG] (noting that the government’s release of the information
was “unusually forthcoming”).
60 See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988) (“[U]nless
Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been re-
luctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We have consistently held [ ] that courts are not a forum for
reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the political
branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security.”).  Admittedly, El-Shifa
notes a distinction between claims regarding the wisdom of a policy choice and
“purely legal issues.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Tatel, J., concurring)).  Such a distinction should be inapplicable in the
Ralls context, however, because the due process issue is inseparable from the
prudential decision about the release of sensitive information. See infra Section
II.B.
61 Christopher S. Kulander, Intruder Alert! Running the Regulatory Gauntlet to
Purchase, Own, and Operate American Energy and Mineral Assets by Foreign
Entities, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 995, 1004 (2014); see also Exec. Order No. 11,858,
40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975) (establishing the committee).
62 Kulander, supra note 61, at 1004. R
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gress to pass the Exon-Florio Amendment to the DPA in 1988,
which provided executive authority to block threatening trans-
actions.63  Initially, legislators sought to allow the President to
block such transactions for purely economic reasons; however,
stiff opposition led to the final version focusing solely on na-
tional security issues.64  Still, the Exon-Florio Amendment
served to strengthen CFIUS and limit Congress’s authority over
the committee by providing clearer executive power.65
In 1993, Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to the
DPA, which further strengthened CFIUS.66  It “mandated an
automatic [CFIUS] investigation” for certain types of transac-
tions, but it still did not give the CFIUS committee the power to
“demand notification of proposed transactions.”67  Conse-
quently, the committee relied heavily on voluntary reports from
foreign investors, which it encouraged with a “safe harbor”
framework that prohibited executive branch national security
review after “CFIUS conclusively determined that a transaction
did not threaten national security.”68
Congress implemented the most significant changes to the
CFIUS process in 2007, when it passed the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act (FINSA).69  FINSA gave CFIUS the
authority to “suspend or even unwind any transaction after
closing” based on a determination that the transaction in ques-
tion threatens critical infrastructure.70  It “require[d] CFIUS to
investigate all foreign investment transactions” involving a for-
eign entity under governmental control,71 and it “fundamen-
tally altered the meaning of national security in the Exon-Florio
provision by including critical infrastructure and homeland se-
63 Id. at 1004–05.
64 See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 27, at 43–45.  This is an important R
distinction, which ensures that CFIUS authority is not used as an instrument of
economic protectionism. But see infra note 75 (presenting arguments in favor of R
and in opposition to that assertion).
65 See Kulander, supra note 61, at 1005. R
66 Id. The Byrd Amendment strengthened CFIUS by lowering the requisite
threat level for it to initiate a review and adding two factors to the “original list of
national security assessment factors.” See Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli, Na-
tional Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act (“FINSA”) in Foreign Investment in the U.S., 2 WM. MITCHELL L. RAZA J.
1, 16–17 (2011).
67 Kulander, supra note 61, at 1005. R
68 Id. at 1005–06.
69 Id. at 1007.
70 Id.
71 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 3.  After FINSA, firms under the control of a R
foreign government bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that a transaction
does not threaten national security. Id.
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curity as areas of concern.”72  Perhaps most importantly,
FINSA more clearly prohibited judicial review of CFIUS
determinations.73
Although national security concerns are of the utmost im-
portance, CFIUS maintains its “longstanding commitment to
welcoming foreign investment.”74  “[N]ational economic secur-
ity” is a recognized factor in CFIUS analysis;75 however, the
government’s policy has generally been to avoid protectionism
in favor of a more open economy.76  The political branches have
also consistently enhanced their authority over CFIUS matters
at the expense of the judiciary.77  This consistency, combined
with traditional deference to the executive in matters of na-
tional security and statutory language that explicitly prohibits
72 Id.
73 de Moraes Gavioli, supra note 66, at 23.  Though the statute’s prohibition R
on judicial review of presidential actions and determinations is clear, a strict
textual interpretation could conclude that courts can review the CFIUS committee.
See Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2012) (emphasizing “Presi-
dent” and not mentioning the committee).  This problem is of little concern in the
Ralls context because the D.C. Circuit Court—though disagreeing with the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the CFIUS Order—focused its holding on the President’s
action. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 325 (2014).
74 Guidance, supra note 14. R
75 Saha, supra note 29, at 215 (quoting JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH R
SERV., THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 13
(2009)).  Some authors argue that FINSA can be misused as “a tool to perpetuate
protectionism.” See, e.g., de Moraes Gavioli, supra note 66, at 29.  Nevertheless, R
national economic security is a distinct concept from protectionism. See THE
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 15 (2015),  http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NQ79-Q6T4] (“The American economy is . . . a source of stability for the
international system.  In addition to being a key measure of power and influence
in its own right, it underwrites our military strength and diplomatic influence.  A
strong economy, combined with a prominent U.S. presence in the global financial
system, creates opportunities to advance our security.”).
76 See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 27, at 43–44 nn.33–36 and accompa- R
nying text (demonstrating executive and congressional objection to proposed leg-
islation that would have given CFIUS broad review power based on purely
economic considerations); Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and
Promoting Foreign Investment, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 890 (2006) (noting that a
protectionist policy approach “has not played itself out” in the past); Matthew C.
Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire Alarms, Police Patrols, and a
New Oversight Regime, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 199, 232–33 (2009)
(arguing that FINSA’s final form “rejected many of the more protectionist provi-
sions” present in earlier versions of the bill and that the Act “reflects a moderate,
responsible position”). But see DAVID M. MARCHICK AND MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GLOBAL FDI POLICY 32 (2008), http://www.cfr.org/
content/publications/attachments/FDl_CSR34.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT2W-
CRZH] (arguing that FINSA and other “recent changes in FDI policies . . . consti-
tute the start of a protectionist drift”).
77 See supra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. R
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judicial review of presidential actions and findings,78 belies the
D.C. Circuit Court’s assertion that it can exercise jurisdiction
in Ralls.
II
PROBLEMS WITH THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT’S
HOLDING IN RALLS
The Ralls holding upended the CFIUS process by declaring
that it lacks necessary elements of due process.79  The decision
failed, however, to establish a framework that would rectify the
concerns that the court raised.  Ultimately, the Ralls decision is
problematic because of its interpretation of the statutory bar
against jurisdiction, its exercise of jurisdiction despite the gov-
ernment’s political question argument, and the policy problems
that it either creates or fails to adequately address.
A. The Statutory Bar on Jurisdiction
In Ralls, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the DPA provision
against review of presidential actions and determinations did
not prohibit review of the procedural due process challenge at
issue.80  The decision notes that the Supreme Court “has long
held that a statutory bar to judicial review precludes review of
constitutional claims only if there is ‘clear and convincing’ evi-
dence that the Congress so intended.”81  In Ralls, the court
relied heavily on two prior cases to find that such evidence was
absent and thereby assert the power to review constitutional
claims: Ungar v. Smith and Ralpho v. Bell.82
In Ungar, the D.C. Circuit Court held that an administra-
tive process to determine ownership rights derived from prop-
erty seized during World War II was reviewable for
78 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e).
79 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
80 See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 311 (2014).
81 Id. at 308 (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667,
681 (1986); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 762 (1975); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974)).  This
Note does not dispute the court’s distinction between constitutional and factual
claims; however, it argues that the court misapplied the facts of the Ralls case to
this legal theory, resulting in an incorrect holding with serious implications for
national security and diplomacy.
82 See id. at 308–12; see also Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 190–96 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (finding that although a statute stated a court could not review Office of
Alien Property claims, that statute did not bar the appellants’ due process claim);
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 613, 621–22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that a statu-
tory bar in the Micronesian Claims Act did not prevent the appellants’ due process
challenge).
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constitutional claims, despite language that broadly precluded
judicial review.83  In that case, which focused on a Hungarian
corporation’s property in the aftermath of the war, the court
held that it could not review agency-determined facts where
Congress forbade such review, but that it had jurisdiction over
constitutional claims about the agency’s procedural mecha-
nisms for making those factual determinations.84 Ralpho simi-
larly demonstrated that “a broadly worded statutory bar [does]
not preclude [ ] consideration of a procedural due process
claim.”85  That case involved “a fund for compensation of losses
incurred by Micronesians during World War II,” from which
Ralpho claimed he could not fully benefit because of “secret
evidence” in an allegedly unfair agency hearing.86
Though Ralpho’s secret evidence is evocative of the scena-
rio presented in Ralls, there are critical differences between the
cases.  Most importantly, Ralpho and Ungar are about adminis-
trative determinations.87  In fact, the significant cases that
support review of constitutional claims despite a statutory bar
on review all fail to support review of the President’s individual
decision-making process, considering only agency actions in-
stead.88  In Ralls, however, the court focuses narrowly on the
President, when its reach should not have extended past the
CFIUS committee, which is an agency and therefore more suit-
able for judicial review.  Notably, other areas of jurisprudence
83 Ungar, 667 F.2d at 197–98.  The relevant statute stated that the adminis-
trative determinations “were . . . to be ‘final’ and ‘not . . . subject to review by any
court.’” Id. at 193 (second omission in original) (quoting 22 U.S.C. §1631o(c)
(1976)).
84 Id. at 190–93.
85 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 309.  The relevant statute stated that “settlements . . .
and . . . payments made . . . under the authority of [the Act] . . . shall be final and
conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary and not subject to review.” Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 613 (quoting 50 U.S.C.
§ 2020).
86 Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 611, 615.  The evidence in question is a study regard-
ing the value of his home, which had been destroyed in the war. Id. at 613–15.
87 See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. R
88 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 598–99 (1988) (seeking review of
actions of the Central Intelligence Agency); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physi-
cians, 476 U.S. 667, 669 (1986) (seeking review of a Medicare regulation); Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 103–04 (1977) (seeking review of an administrative
decision regarding social security benefits); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 438
F.3d 184, 186 (3rd Cir. 2007) (seeking review of actions of the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals); Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1470 (7th Cir. 1988)
(seeking review of actions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals); Ungar, 667 F.2d at
189 (seeking review of actions of the Office of Alien Property); Ralpho, 569 F.2d at
611 (seeking review of actions of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States).
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make clear that the President is not an agency, and nothing
suggests that this status would change for CFIUS matters.89
Some argue that the judiciary is always empowered to re-
view constitutional claims.90  But the President’s refusal to re-
veal the facts upon which he made a CFIUS determination is
not a constitutional issue because the relevant procedure is at
the agency level, not the Oval Office.91  Of course, not all presi-
dential actions are free from judicial review; however, it seems
unlikely that Congress intended to allow review of such action
here, because it is entirely different from the Ralpho or Ungar-
type scenarios that trigger the clear and convincing evidence
standard.  Consequently, the judiciary’s claim of legislative
support for review of the President’s discretionary CFIUS au-
thority may lack merit.
What then of reviewing the CFIUS committee?  This Note’s
interpretation of the statutory bar, which focuses on the Presi-
dent himself rather than the executive branch as a whole, ad-
mittedly leaves the committee subject to judicial review.  But
the statutory bar is not the only impediment to jurisdiction.
Even though alone it would not prohibit the judiciary from
reviewing the CFIUS committee,92 the courts should not be
able to do so for other reasons—jurisdictional and pruden-
tial.93  As a result, the Ralls decision may not only be bad law
but also bad judicial policy.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
Even if the DPA does not bar jurisdiction over this case, the
political question doctrine suggests that Ralls should evade
judicial review.  This doctrine of justiciability, which stems
89 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revis-
ited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1613–14 (1997) (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) for the proposition that the President is not subject
to the APA); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Agency” for Pur-
poses of Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552), 165 A.L.R. FED. 591, at 4b
(2000) (noting that the President is not an “agency” under FOIA).  Note that
Siegel’s arguments in favor of the widely-overlooked nonstatutory review doctrine
are distinct from constitutional challenges such as those at issue in Ralls; there-
fore, they are not relevant to this Note. See Siegel, supra at 1618–19.
90 E.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 250, 260 (2012).
91 Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172–73 (noting a “long line of decisions[ ] [where] the Su-
preme Court has declined to review whether the President has properly invoked
his statutory powers”); see also supra note 89. R
92 See supra notes 82–86, 88–90 and accompanying text. R
93 See infra Section III.B.
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from the separation of powers, features a multifactor test.94
The Supreme Court noted that a case involving a political ques-
tion will prominently feature
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.95
Only one of these factors must be present for courts to deter-
mine that the matter raises a nonjusticiable political question
under the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation.96  Turning to Ralls,
even if the government had violated Ralls Corp.’s constitutional
rights, application of this doctrine would avoid a constitutional
dilemma, in keeping with the notion that “there are indeed
some rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the violation of
which the courts cannot give redress.”97
A presidential determination regarding a CFIUS matter
should fit squarely within the exclusive purview of the execu-
tive, because, as the Supreme Court recognizes, “[f]oreign pol-
icy and national security is textually committed to the political
branches.”98  Likewise, the decision of the President to with-
hold information that he used to reach a discretionary decision
on these topics is a “policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.”99 Ralls impermissibly usurps the Pres-
94 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the various “for-
mulations” used in determining justiciability of a matter before the court).
95 Id.
96 Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
97 Baker, 369 U.S. at 197 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D.
Tenn. 1959)).
98 Schneider, 412 F.3d at 195; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918) (stating that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments of the Government”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,
607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We have consistently held, however, that
courts are not a forum for reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions
made by the political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national
security.”).
99 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  This Baker factor does not R
mean that any impact on foreign policy renders the matter nonjusticiabile, but
rather that a political question is found where adjudication will “displac[e] the
Executive in its foreign policy making role.”  Kimberly Breedon, Remedial
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ident’s foreign policy-making authority.  Releasing information
that might imply the government’s attitude toward a foreign
power detracts from the executive’s ability to craft a diplomatic
strategy for that foreign power and possibly others.100  Further-
more, the judiciary is unable to act effectively in this area.101
The President’s expertise, advisors, and superior access to in-
formation allow him to determine whether the release of infor-
mation would alter the diplomatic landscape.  Such an expert
perspective is unavailable to the judiciary.102  Finally, the
speed with which the executive must act on matters of security
and diplomacy simply cannot be matched by the judicial
branch, presenting yet another reason why courts should not
interfere.103
Although the political question doctrine does not prohibit
courts from reviewing constitutional questions that are tangen-
tially related to foreign relations or national security, it does
prohibit review of claims involving prudential decisions com-
mitted to Congress or the President.104  The Ralls court relied
on People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State105 to
Problems at the Intersection of the Political Question Doctrine, the Standing Doc-
trine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 523, 548–49
(quoting Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 389 (3d Cir.
2006)).
100 See generally Laura A. White, The Need for Government Secrecy, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1071, 1072–74, 1093 (2003) (noting the importance of secrecy for national
security and diplomacy).
101 Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51
VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 509–10 (arguing that “[s]ecrecy, speed, and decisiveness are at
a premium [in issues of foreign affairs], and these are characteristics of the execu-
tive, not of the courts, which are slow and decentralized”).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841–43 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (citing Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  As
discussed previously, the language of the Exon-Florio Amendment and subse-
quent legislation clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to give the Presi-
dent such prudential authority over CFIUS matters. See supra Section I.B.
Though limiting the President’s and CFIUS’s power to matters of national
security (as opposed to economic security), the history of the legislative basis for
CFIUS review demonstrates that Congress envisioned strong executive authority
to take action on covered transactions that constitute a security threat.  This is
evidenced particularly by an expansive definition of “national security,” which
gives CFIUS and the President broader review power and shows the legislature’s
consistent disapproval of judicial review over the President’s actions. Supra Sec-
tion I.B.  Even though FINSA increased congressional oversight of the CFIUS
committee, it had no limiting effect on the President’s actions and did not estab-
lish any significant shift in decision-making authority from CFIUS to Congress.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012). Foreign Investment and National Security Act of
2007 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246.
105 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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illustrate “the distinction between a justiciable legal challenge
and a non-justiciable political question” of this sort.106  In that
case, the court held that it could not review a determination
that an entity was a Foreign Terrorist Organization, but that
they could review the procedure by which the State Depart-
ment reached that conclusion.107  Although the Ralls court saw
similarities with this case, it missed a key distinction.  Ordering
the government to turn over information is not truly about its
decision-making procedure.  Instead, it involves a separate de-
termination, which in Ralls is about conducting foreign affairs
and addressing national security concerns.  The decision to
restrict that information is a prudential determination inextri-
cably linked to these policy areas, which necessarily require
delicate control of information and opinions.108  As such, the
release of information that led to a presidential decision on
security or diplomacy is not a procedural matter but rather a
substantive one.  It is a policy choice in areas that are undenia-
bly under executive authority.109  In El-Shifa, the Supreme
Court noted that just as “plaintiff[s] may not . . .  clear the
political question bar simply by ‘recasting [ ] foreign policy and
national security questions in tort terms,’” surely they cannot
avoid the bar by recasting such questions in property terms.110
Nevertheless, the appellants in Ralls attempt a comparable de-
ception by cloaking foreign policy and national security ques-
tions in terms of a due process challenge.
The circumstances of the Ralls case demonstrate the need
for strong executive control over these policy areas.  The per-
ceived threat posed by Ralls Corp. (and Sany Group, its affili-
ate) presumably stems from its executives’ relationship with
the Chinese government.111  How the executive releases infor-
106 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 313–14 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
107 Id.
108 Consider, for example, the Wikileaks data release, which offered foreign
governments “an unprecedented look at back-room bargaining by embassies
around the world, brutally candid views of foreign leaders and frank assessments
of nuclear and terrorist threats.”  Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked
Cables Offer Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
The New York Times recognized that the Wikileaks scandal “could strain relations
with some countries.” Id.
109 Supra note 99 and accompanying text. R
110 See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842–43
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
111 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 304.  The corporation is hugely significant in China, and
Liang Wengen, its founder and chief shareholder, is among “the [Chinese Commu-
nist] [P]arty’s most influential members.”  Tseng, supra note 34. R
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mation that might reflect sensitive views on China is a diplo-
matic decision that has a wide-ranging impact on national
security.112  For this reason, the Ralls decision’s requirement
that the President release all unclassified information used to
make a determination on Ralls Corp.’s transactions is highly
problematic.  Unclassified information about the company
could compromise the United States’ relationship with China
by implying a mistrust of the Chinese government and affiliated
corporate actors.  The resulting impact on international rela-
tions could be significant.  Of course, this problem does not
just exist for the Ralls case.  From 2010 to 2012, CFIUS re-
viewed thirty-nine Chinese acquisitions, the second-most for a
single country behind the United Kingdom.113  Furthermore,
Chinese FDI is on an upward trend,114 suggesting that Ralls-
like scenarios, with their resulting potential for embarrassment
and diplomatic awkwardness, could easily unfold in the fu-
ture.115  Consequently, the Ralls decision’s disregard for the
political question doctrine stands poised to promote that which
the doctrine exists to protect against—judiciary meddling in an
area beyond its expertise and authority, with potentially disas-
trous results.
Despite this cautionary tale, some argue that the political
question doctrine is dying, which might partially explain the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Ralls.116  Of course, dying and dead
are entirely different, and threats to the doctrine make it more
important than ever for each of the political branches to assert
their authority to interpret the Constitution.117  The Obama
112 See Christopher K. Johnson, Recalibrating on China, in CSIS GLOBAL FORE-
CAST 2015, at 74, http://csis.org/files/publication/141117_Johnson.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G6JF-G3J5] (noting “the seeming intractability of many of the security
challenges in the relationship [between the United States and China]”).
113 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., supra note 14, at 17. R
114 See id.
115 This Note does not intend to suggest that Chinese FDI alone raises this
potential issue; however, other leading investors—Canada, France, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, for example—present fewer diplomatic challenges from an
American perspective because of the security relationships shared among those
nations. See id.; NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES, http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
nato_countries.htm [http://perma.cc/3VPW-Y7TF]; Beina Xu, The U.S.-Japan Se-
curity Alliance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 1, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/
japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437 [http://perma.cc/ZR6D-5TVM].
116 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239–44
(2002) (noting a “demise of the political question doctrine” and the “ascendancy of
a novel theory of judicial supremacy”).
117 See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 97, 101 (1988) (“Any interpretation [of the political question doctrine]
that fits our tradition must acknowledge that courts share responsibility for inter-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN405.txt unknown Seq: 20  4-MAY-16 13:29
1106 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1087
administration chose a different course of action by failing to
appeal the Ralls decision or even raise a meaningful executive
privilege claim.118  Where the President could have resusci-
tated the faltering political question doctrine, he may instead
have contributed to its ultimate demise.
C. Counterproductive Result
The Ralls decision represents a judicial demand for in-
creased transparency in the CFIUS process.  By holding that
due process requires the government to provide all unclassified
information about why it reached its determination,119 the D.C.
Circuit Court placed a significant limitation on the govern-
ment’s interest in secrecy.120  Despite the court’s efforts, how-
ever, the decision will likely encourage the government to
forcefully limit access to relevant information by classifying
that which would otherwise be left unclassified.121  This
counterproductive result will not only impact the CFIUS pro-
cess but also could create a precedent for more stringent clas-
sification in the face of public demand for—and executive
promises of—enhanced transparency.122
preting the Constitution with the political branches of government.”); Heather P.
Scribner, A Fundamental Misconception of Separation of Powers: Boumediene v.
Bush, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 90, 93 (2009) (describing how Marbury v. Madison
does not prohibit Congress and the President from engaging in constitutional
interpretation).
118 See Weinmann, supra note 59 (reporting that CFIUS handed over docu- R
ments ordered by the Ralls decision, which implies a decision).  The executive
privilege claim would not really be an adequate solution to the problems
presented by the liberty and security balance. See infra Section II.D.
119 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120 A State’s interest in secrecy is, of course, not inherently self-serving or
political in nature. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of
Government Secrecy, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 513 (2013) (noting that
“there are undoubtedly circumstances in which withholding information from
broad dissemination necessarily fosters or reinforces security”).  Aftergood also
notes, however, that in many other cases “the national security justification for
secrecy is uncertain.” Id.
121 The language in Ralls is that “due process does not require disclosure of
classified information supporting official action.”  758 F.3d at 319.  This is prob-
lematic because the government withholds certain types of unclassified informa-
tion for associated threats to national security.  Christina E. Wells, “National
Security” Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195,
1197 (2004).
122 See Aftergood, supra note 120, at 511 (recognizing public disappointment); R
Thomas C. Ellington, The Most Transparent Administration in History?: An Assess-
ment of Official Secrecy in the Obama Administration’s First Term, 15 PUB. INTEG-
RITY 133, 134–35 (2013) (arguing that the administration failed in its first term to
“live up to its stated goal” of enhanced openness); Wells, supra note 121, at R
1217–21 (noting that “[e]xcessive secrecy may [ ] be inevitable” due to the execu-
tive’s secrecy interest and its control over much of the information).
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The government has broad authority to classify informa-
tion as it sees fit;123 consequently, the distinction between un-
classified and classified does not provide a meaningful
standard for the judiciary to police CFIUS.  That difference re-
fers only to a government determination about the importance
of certain information, rather than any objective characteristic
of that information itself.  Executive Order 13,526, which con-
tains the rules for classification, endorses as a “principal con-
dition for imposing classification . . . ‘that the unauthorized
disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
result in damage to the national security.’”124  This language is
vague and “grant[s] all but unlimited discretion to classification
officials.”125  The government is held simply to a reasonable-
ness standard when defending the classification of informa-
tion.126  In the highly interconnected modern world, where
information is a critical weapon, a classifying authority would
not find it difficult to craft a reasonable argument that release
of a certain document could harm the country’s national secur-
ity interests.
The result, particularly in light of the broad definition of
national security that applies in the CFIUS process,127 is that
the classification system could become overzealous, prohibit-
ing the development of a more open and accountable society.
The conflict between accountability and security interests is
well documented.128  The Ralls decision, however, notably
demonstrates that the debate on this question is not solely
123 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Jan. 5, 2010) (allowing
significant delegation of classification authority and broad classification catego-
ries, which include “foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States”);
Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (discussing presidential
“authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national
security”).
124 Aftergood, supra note 120, at 513 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. R
Reg. at 707). But see Ellington, supra note 122, at 143 (noting that the Order R
establishes “a presumption of openness in classification decisions”).
125 Aftergood, supra note 120, at 513. R
126 Exec. Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. at § 1.4 (“Information shall not be consid-
ered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security.”)
(emphasis added).  Note that this standard requires classifying authorities to have
the ability to identify future damage to national security, but it does not require
them to actually identify or describe that damage.  Aftergood, supra note 120, at R
513.  This allows them to take proactive steps to neutralize future threats, even
though the exact nature of the threat may be uncertain.
127 See supra notes 14, 71–72 and accompanying text. R
128 See, e.g., CAMPBELL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE, vi–vii (2003) (noting that most conten-
tious secrecy cases in the world were more about hiding government wrongdoing
than protecting a nation’s security interests).
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between competing ideologies or political factions.  In the
matchup between openness and discretion, the headlining
pugilists may in fact be the judicial and executive branches of
the federal government.  But where the D.C. Circuit Court
landed a solid blow with Ralls, the President failed to counter
with the best remaining strategy available to him—an executive
privilege claim.129
D. Inviting Resolution on Executive Privilege Grounds
A deceptively obvious solution to the Ralls problems is the
President’s executive privilege; however, that option is far from
ideal.  An executive privilege claim is an assertion “of a consti-
tutional right to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, or persons or agencies,” which is derived from Article
II.130  Though The Federalist Papers suggest that Hamilton and
Jay supported this privilege, not all of the founders agreed.131
Nevertheless, executive privilege has played a vital role in the
American presidency, taking on particular importance in the
post-World War II world.132
Executive privilege involves two broader forms of privilege:
the state secrets privilege and the official information privi-
lege.133  The former “arises only when secret military or diplo-
matic information is sought,” whereas the latter applies more
broadly, “based on the theory that optimal efficiency in the
governmental decision-making process depends upon a free
flow of ideas, and frank discussion.”134  As the Supreme Court
has made clear, however, there is not “an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under
all circumstances.”135  Notably, a privilege claim does not itself
end the matter.  Instead, the claim must be brought before a
court, which has the power to rule on it and decide whether the
privilege will apply.136
The President’s information about CFIUS investigations
should fit into both forms of the executive privilege.  Courts
129 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
130 Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revis-
ited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491–92 (2007).
131 See id. at 491, 506 (noting Benjamin Franklin’s “astonishment” that the
executive branch should have such power and quoting Hamilton and Jay in
Federalist 70 and 64, respectively).
132 Id. at 491.
133 Seymour Moskowitz & Janet Capurro Graham, 12-5 BENDER’S FORMS OF
DISCOVERY TREATISE § 5.08(1) (2015).
134 Id.
135 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
136 See id. at 694–95.
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take seriously the responsibility to protect national security
secrets;137 consequently, the state secrets privilege must apply
in Ralls where the President determines that release of the
information could impact diplomatic relations with China, a
geopolitical rival.  Furthermore, “communications made by
presidential advisers in the course of preparing advice for the
President come under the presidential communications privi-
lege.”138  As a result, courts should not be able to release docu-
ments that informed (and therefore might suggest the content
of) such presidential communication.
The immediate problem is that the President chose not to
meaningfully take this route.139  Without access to the docu-
ments that he released and those that he withheld, there is no
standard by which to gauge the potential impact of a more
exacting executive privilege claim in the Ralls case.  Neverthe-
less, the precedent that the President set by releasing such a
vast amount of information is problematic because it repre-
sents a surrender to the judiciary’s interference in the CFIUS
process.  Had the President made a broader executive privilege
claim, the D.C. District Court might have resolved the case in
favor of the executive.  Although that would have been the best
option remaining to the President after losing on statutory bar
and justiciability grounds, this method of resolution presents
broader issues.
First, closing this matter by means of executive privilege
creates the possibility for significant public controversy.
CFIUS will undoubtedly face a similar scenario in the future,
and it is inadvisable to create a constitutional showdown be-
tween the President and the courts each time it does.  This
public spectacle could spiral into greater scandal if the Presi-
dent were to disregard a court order to release documents so
that a higher court could review that order.  As the Supreme
Court recognized,
[t]o require a President of the United States to place himself
in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to
trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling
would be unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occa-
sion for constitutional confrontation between two branches of
the Government.140
137 Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (“[E]ven the most
compelling [litigation] necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court
is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.”).
138 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
139 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
140 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691–92.
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A situation like this could shake public confidence in the Amer-
ican justice system and place the executive’s decision-making
process in jeopardy.
Additionally, resolution of this issue on executive privilege
grounds would create a bureaucratic and unnecessary system
of litigation with no real chance of changing the ultimate result,
because the final decision that the President makes about a
CFIUS-covered transaction is not reviewable.141  The case-by-
case litigation, which would largely avoid the more important
justiciability questions, would improperly involve the judiciary
at the expense of judicial efficiency, executive time, and tax-
payer money.
E. Thematic Concerns
The thematic issue with the Ralls holding, exemplified by
each of the aforementioned problems, is that it does not ade-
quately establish a balance between liberty and security.
Where a corporation’s property rights—here, those of Ralls
Corp.—are threatened, liberty is undeniably at issue.  Where
judicial overreach leads a court to address prudential ques-
tions of national security and foreign affairs, security is dimin-
ished by the lack of authority and expertise with which the
judiciary approaches these issues.142  Finally, where a court
decision is counterproductive or leads to inefficiency, both lib-
erty and security are threatened because both the justice sys-
tem and the executive’s security apparatus are needlessly
distracted from their primary purposes with superfluous
proceedings.
The government generally cannot take property without
due process.143  Determining what process is due, as the court
in Ungar opined, “involves a balance between the interests of
the claimants and of the Government.”144  In Ralls, this bal-
ance mirrors the liberty and security balance that comprises
the thematic basis of this Note.  Disconcertingly, however, the
D.C. Circuit Court strongly emphasized the liberty side at the
141 Though the Ralls decision allowed for review of constitutional claims re-
garding the CFIUS procedure, the court correctly held that the ultimate determi-
nation is not reviewable.  Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 311
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
142 Supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. R
143 U.S. CONST. amend. V (establishing that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
144 Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  On remand, the D.C.
District Court oversaw the application of that procedure. See Ralls Corp. v.
Comm. on Foreign Inv., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177868 (D.D.C. 2014).
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expense of security, despite the fact that both are of the highest
importance.  It did this primarily by setting a precedent that
enables courts to order the President to turn over information
that led to his decision on a CFIUS-covered transaction,145 but
more broadly by establishing a judicial forum for foreign enti-
ties to challenge CFIUS and the President,146 thereby creating
opportunities for diplomatic embarrassment and a resulting
detrimental impact on national security.  The President’s re-
sponse—refusing to appeal the decision or even make a mean-
ingful executive privilege claim147—makes this bad result even
worse, ceding significant executive power in the realm of diplo-
macy and national security.
III
FINDING THE BALANCE BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SECURITY
If the Ralls decision did not adequately address the need
for balance between liberty and security, then there must be
better alternatives.  This Note proposes different approaches
depending on whether Ralls remains good law, or if it does not.
A. If Ralls Remains Good Law
Finding the balance between liberty and security with re-
spect to CFIUS will be incredibly difficult while Ralls remains
good law.  The decision simply weighs too heavily on the liberty
side without due consideration for security.  The only possible
solution would be consistent judicial deference on executive
privilege claims pertaining to the release of CFIUS information.
This is very unlikely to occur.148  Unlike a policy that can be set
in one fell swoop by one of the political branches, this would
require unrealistic consistency and agreement from the judici-
ary.  Also, though the D.C. Circuit Court made no ruling on
potential executive privilege claims,149 the President’s release
of massive amounts of information sets a bad precedent in this
area.150  Finally, as previously identified, resolution on execu-
tive privilege claims is not an ideal solution to the due process
problems that CFIUS presents.151  As a result, striking a bal-
145 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 325.
146 See id.
147 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
148 See generally Amanda Frost, Overvauling Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567,
1612–14 (2008) (arguing that uniformity is unlikely in the federal judiciary).
149 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320–21 (“[W]e leave it to the district court on remand to
consider whether the executive privilege shields the ordered disclosure.”).
150 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
151 See supra Section II.D.
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ance between liberty and security will likely require at least the
partial abandonment of Ralls.
B. If Ralls Is Overturned
If future litigation or legislation renders Ralls bad law, it
might be tempting to allow the pre-Ralls status quo to continue
as it had before.  It would be reasonable to conclude that for-
eign entities seeking certain FDI opportunities in the United
States are under constructive notice that they should commu-
nicate with CFIUS prior to finalizing their acquisitions, and
that consequently, later prohibition of a transaction would not
constitute an unlawful deprivation of property.152  But does
this, in and of itself, solve the balance problem?  Likely, no.
Despite the importance of national security, liberty expressed
through property rights is a fundamental aspect of the Consti-
tution and the American ethos.153 Ralls threatens the CFIUS
function and creates challenges for national security; however,
without some level of additional process, CFIUS and the Presi-
dent may be evading at least the spirit of the American consti-
tutional system, if not actually violating foreign entities’ rights.
The solution may lie outside the judiciary’s authority.  In-
stead, CFIUS in a post-Ralls world would be well suited for
executive or congressional reform.  These branches could add
additional process without violating the political question doc-
trine and giving the judiciary undue power over foreign affairs
and national security.
CONCLUSION
There are those who think that the world should be free
from the encumbrances of borders, believing instead that the
future of mankind lies in a harmonious global community
forged by common interest and a desire to seek the common
good.154  In the international system as it currently stands,
152 See Guidance, supra note 14, at 74,569.  Additionally, current advice from R
U.S. law firms suggests that this is, in fact, common knowledge. See, e.g., Lo´pez-
Casero, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining how Ralls had failed to notify CFIUS of the R
transaction prior to closing and was then subsequently blocked by a Presidential
Order); Giovanna M. Cinelli & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Common Misconceptions
Regarding CFIUS and the CFIUS Process, JONES DAY (2012), http://www.jonesday.
com/common_misconceptions_regarding_cfius/ [https://perma.cc/TM2J-7H62]
(noting that “although the process remains voluntary, the analysis needed to
make an informed decision on whether to file a notification [with CFIUS] should be
conducted for every transaction”).
153 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. R
154 See, e.g., Shaun Raviv, If People Could Immigrate Anywhere, Would Poverty
Be Eliminated?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2013) http://www.theatlantic.com/inter
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however, economic vitality relies upon defense against external
threats.155  As a result, support for property rights in foreign
direct investment necessarily presupposes limitations for se-
curity measures, which enable the stability that a property
regime requires.
That does not mean, however, that the government should
unnecessarily sacrifice liberty for the sake of security.  If we
recognize that the courts cannot resolve constitutional ques-
tions like those that arise in Ralls, then the political branches
have a responsibility to exercise their power in a manner that
reflects constitutional principles.  That is why a solution to the
balancing problem that is driven by those branches is most
favorable—it respects the political question doctrine and the
need for executive authority over national security, while sup-
porting ideals of the Constitution that could otherwise be ig-
nored.  In short, while the pre-Ralls CFIUS process may not
have been unconstitutional, it is desirable that constitutional
ideals be vindicated to the greatest extent possible.  In other
words, the government should align CFIUS more directly with
the constitution through executive and legislative branch
action.
What lasting effect will the Ralls decision have on CFIUS?
Likely a minimal one.  The executive branch will find ways to
avoid divulging information that could critically damage diplo-
macy or national security.  Foreign entities seeking to invest in
the United States will still be subject to CFIUS review and to
the President’s determinations.  Nevertheless, Ralls sets a dan-
gerous precedent for judicial interference in national security
and diplomacy.  The silver lining to this case, however, is that it
might encourage the political branches to take the type of re-
formative action that this Note proposes.  In this way, the gov-
national/archive/2013/04/if-people-could-immigrate-anywhere-would-poverty-
be-eliminated/275332/ [https://perma.cc/YJ6J-VBL3]; JOHN LENNON, Imagine,
on IMAGINE (Ascot Sound Studios 1971) (inviting the listener to “imagine there’s
[sic] no countries” and arguing that, as a result of such thinking, “the world will be
as one”).
155 See generally, e.g., Ji Guoxing, SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific, ASIA-
PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES ¶¶1–30, 44–55 (2000) (noting the economic
importance of securing sea lines of communication); Laura Mills, Conflict in
Ukraine Hammers Economy, WALL STREET J., May 16, 2015, at A6 (“The economy
of Ukraine shrank by more than one-sixth in the first quarter [of 2015], hammered
by a conflict with Russia-backed separatists that has slashed industrial output.”);
Erika Solomon, Syrian Middle Class Suffers as Economy Hit by Rebel Gains, FIN.
TIMES, May 17, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4aea5cc4-f96a-11e4-
ae65-00144feab7de.html#axzz3pJE5CXTz [https://perma.cc/7GKG-6CM7]
(“Those surviving the bloodshed say they are struggling to cope with an ever-
worsening economy.”).
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ernment can defend the United States and protect its interests
while upholding those ideological values that define the nation
and its people.
